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Timely production and distribution of fertilizer will increase farmer productivity
Agricultural input supply
Joseph Rusike and Chrispen Sukume
The preconditions for the development and growth of agricultural input supply 
systems for smallholders were established in the 1940s and 1950s, mainly as 
spin-offs from public and private investments targeted at large-scale commer­
cial farmers. These included government agricultural research stations that re­
leased new cultivars, nutrients, pesticides and farm equipment technologies 
that private sector firms could sell to farmers at a profit. They also included 
public extension services that cooperated with private firms, farm credit, mar­
ket channels and favourable government policies. Agribusiness firms entered 
the input markets by initially focusing on large-scale commercial farmers and 
later expanding to smallholders in favourable areas.
This chapter discusses the historical development of the fertilizer and chemi­
cal industries from the pre-independence and post-independence eras to the 
introduction of structural adjustment reforms in 1991, changes during the eco­
nomic reforms in the 1990s, and finally changes and challenges emanating 
with the land and agrarian reforms since 2000. After 70 years o f servicing mainly 
large-scale commercial farmers, the fertilizer and chemical industry is now 
being challenged to re-invent itself and supply relevant farm management in­
formation, knowledge, technology, capital and services to an increased number 
of black commercial and smallholder fanners, scattered in all parts of the coun­
try. The smallholder fertilizer problem is complex and has been debated for 
decades.
Evolution of fertilizer systems and performance: 1930-1990
The industries supplying fertilizer, pesticide and farm machinery and equip­
ment emerged in the 1930s and initially grew through market expansion of 
multinationals based in South Africa, Europe and the United States of America. 
For example, Fisons Limited (United Kingdom) registered Fison Albatros (Zim­
babwe) in 1930 to market fertilizers and chemical products. Phosphate produc­
tion started in 1930 when African Explosives and Chemical Industries of South
38 See Crawford et al., 2003 and 2005; Kelly et al., 2003 and Lele et al., 1989.
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Organ i sat ion/C'ompany Year
formed
Purpose Strategy
Zimplow (formerly 
Rhodesia Plough and 
Marketing Company)
1939 Distribute farm 
machinery and 
equipment
Reduce imports from Europe
African Explosives & 
Chemical Industries
1946 Subsidiary formed at 
Dorowa
Develop local phosphate ore
Windmill fertilizer 
Company (subsidiary of 
Windmill Holland 
formed in 1928)
1947 Production and 
marketing facilities for 
fertilizer, pesticides and 
veterinary products
Largest phosphate factory in 
Europe seeking export 
markets in southern Africa
Milborrow Animal 
Health (formerly 
Milborrow and 
Company)
1951 Subsidiary of Glaxo 
Group Limited of 
London to supply 
veterinary medicines, 
instruments and 
equipment
Cyanamid (formerly 
Shell Chemicals)
1952 Supply shell chemicals
Technical Services 
(Africa)
1952 Import and distribute 
agricultural fumigants 
and insecticides
Hoeschst (established 
Chemimpo Company)
1956 Import and distribute 
agricultural fumigants 
and insecticides
Chemimpo was a subsidiary 
of Chemimpo South Africa 
which in turn was a subsidi­
ary of the Dutch & Overseas 
Trading of Holland. 
Chemimpo changed its name 
in 1960 to Hoeschst
Pfizer Corporation 
(United States) 
(subsidiary Central 
African Pfizer Limited)
1957 Manufacture, distribute 
pharmaceutical, 
agricultural and 
chemical products
Bayer (formerly Agro­
chemicals)
1961 Registered in South Africa 
and also incorporated in 
Canada
Cooper McDougall and 
Robertson (Central 
Africa) registered as 
Cooper (Zimbabwe)
1957 Changed its name to Cooper 
(Rhodesia) in 1972 then 
Welcome (Zimbabwe) in 
1990. Restructured to 
Ecological Marketing 
(Ecomark) in 1992 and 
trading as Agrevo
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Africa established a subsidiary to manufacture fertilizers and other chemicals 
in Harare using imported raw materials.
During the immediate years after the Second World War, there was signifi­
cant expansion in large-scale commercial farming in Zimbabwe because of the 
rapid increase in the growing of tobacco for export and maize to satisfy the 
staple food requirements of the increasing population and stockfeed for the 
beef and dairy industries. Greater crop production markedly increased the de­
mand for mineral fertilizers, pesticides and farm machinery and equipment. To 
support the development of fertilizer and pesticide supply systems, the govern­
ment enacted the Fertilizer, Farm Feeds and Remedies Act of 1952, which it 
amended in 1965, and the Fertilizers Regulations in 1972 to prevent the adul­
teration of products. The Act required all fertilizer and agrochemical compa­
nies to first register their products with the registering officer of the former 
Department of Research and Specialist Services before they could sell them in 
the country. In addition, all pesticides had to be placed in group II or III of 
hazardous substances under the provisions of the Hazardous Substances and 
Articles Act (Chapter 322).
The increased demand was initially met from the domestic production of 
granular compound fertilizers using imported nitrogen, phosphate and potash 
raw materials. In 1960 African Explosives and Chemical Industries, the fore­
runners of the current Zimbabwe Phosphate Industries (Zimphos), tapped the 
apatite deposit at Dorowa in the east of Zimbabwe. The concentrated rock was 
transported by road and rail to the phosphate manufacturing plant in Harare 
and converted into single and triple superphosphate. This process used sulphu­
ric acid derived from the local pyrites deposits at Glendale. For the next 35 
years, Zimphos supplied nearly all the phosphate needs of the local compound 
fertilizer manufacturing industry.
When the United Nations imposed mandatory sanctions on Zimbabwe (then 
Rhodesia) in 1965, it enforced restrictions on importation of raw materials and 
finished products. Several companies were formed to circumvent sanctions. 
For example, Agricura was established in 1965 as a subsidiary of Agricura 
South Africa with 50 per cent equity, the other 50 per cent equity being control­
led by Tobacco Sales. Agricura produced and distributed crop chemicals, cos­
metics, detergents, maize and stockfeeds. Similarly, Spray Equipment was in­
corporated in 1965 to trade as agents for veterinary and pharmaceutical sup­
plies, fertilizers, insecticides and livestock foods, and to manufacture agricul­
tural sprayers and equipment. Sable Chemical Industries was established in 
1969 to produce the necessary nitrogen component for fertilizer in Zimbabwe. 
The company opted for the production of ammonium nitrate based on the local 
synthesis of ammonia. The necessary nitrogen feedstock was obtained by air 
separation and the hydrogen component by the water electrolysis process. The 
company chose water electrolysis because electricity at that time was abun-
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dantly available at low prices from the Kariba South power station.
The Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company was formed in 1971 as a result of a 
merger of the fertilizer and crop chemical interests of African Explosives and 
Chemical Industries, Albatros Fisons and Fisons Pest Control (Central Africa) 
Limited. The Zimbabwe Phosphate Industries (formerly Rodia Chemical 
Industries) was formed in 1972 as a subsidiary of African Explosives and Chemi­
cal Industries to manufacture fertilizers, disinfectants, animal dips, pesticides 
and herbicides. Windmill’s shareholding was restructured and domestic in­
vestors controlled the majority shareholding. This resulted in the concentra­
tion of the fertilizer and chemical industries being dominated by Zimbabwean- 
based companies. The domination of Zimbabwean-based firms was consid­
ered strategically important to the agricultural industry as fertilizer supply was 
based primarily on indigenous raw materials: phosphate rock from Dorowa, 
sulphuric acid from local pyrites and nitrogenous fertilizers from Sable. Since 
there are no local sources of potash that can be exploited, potassium chloride 
and potassium sulphate components had to be imported. This raw material sce­
nario gave rise to a range of granular fertilizer components whose plant nutri­
ent concentrations were restricted by the raw materials available: ammonium 
nitrate, single superphosphate, triple superphosphate, muriate of potash and 
sulphate of potash. Because of foreign currency allocations by the government, 
there were few opportunities for new competitors to enter fertilizer and chemi­
cal manufacturing and distribution.
The expansion of Zimbabwean fertilizer production was fostered by agree­
ments between government and local companies and by the foreign exchange 
allocation system and import licensing which made it difficult for potential 
entrants to enter the domestic fertilizer market. For example, Sable Chemical 
Company and the Minister of Industry and Commerce signed an agreement at 
its formation for the erection and operation of a nitrogenous fertilizer plant 
under which the company sold its production at cost plus a profit equal to 4 per 
cent per annum of the nominal value of issued share capital and the govern
139Fison Albatros changed its name to Fisons Fertilizers in 1958. Fisons Fertilizers then 
changed its name to Albatros Fisons Fertilizers in 1967. Albatros Fisons Fertilizers changed 
its name to AFF Holdings in 1972 because Albatros were no longer shareholders in the 
^ co m p an y .
Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company was linked to Kynoch Feeds and Triomf Fertilizers in 
South Africa through African Explosives and Chemical Industries.
In 1970 an American company bought Windmill Holland but then sold shares to local 
commodity associations: the Commercial Cotton Growers’ Association (30 per cent), the 
Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (10 percent), the Commercial Grain Producers’Associa­
tion (10 per cent), and the Farmers’ Cooperative (14 per cent). Windmill Holland held 25 
per cent equity while the remaining 2 per cent was held by the Windmill Pension Fund 
and staff members. There have been changes since the 1970s. The shares held by tobacco 
growers have been bought by Consolidated Farming Investments, which now controls 23 
per cent of the equity of Windmill.
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ment purchased the company’s entire production. The profit level was gradu­
ally increased from 4 per cent to 22.5 per cent from 1975 until its termination 
in 1990. Sable was also protected from international competition by the for­
eign exchange allocation system that provided foreign currency for importing 
fertilizer raw materials only to established firms and prevented imports of fin­
ished products through import licensing. The government entered into similar 
agreements with the management of African Explosives and Chemical Indus­
tries, and Windmill. The government also controlled the selling prices of the 
products of Zimphos, Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company and Windmill by taking 
into account production cost variances from predetermined standards when 
establishing current prices. This arrangement induced fertilizer companies to 
operate price stabilization accounts that carried forward the value of variances 
of production costs from preceding years to be included in subsequent price 
increases. At that time, the government also controlled the producer prices of 
the major crop commodities, namely maize, wheat, cotton, sugar cane, soyabeans 
and sunflowers. These crops have historically consumed more than 75 per cent 
of fertilizer and chemical sales.
Another barrier to entry by external companies was that foreign currency 
was never made available to import any o f the nitrogen or phosphate com­
pounds unless it could be clearly shown that local demand would exceed local 
production capabilities. By 1980 there were six major companies engaged in 
fertilizer production and marketing: Dorowa Minerals, G. D. Haulage, Zimba­
bwe Phosphate Industries, Sable Chemicals, Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company 
Limited and Windmill. Dorowa Minerals, G. D. Haulage, and Zimbabwe 
Phosphate Industries primarily produced superphosphates and Sable produced 
ammonium nitrate. The superphosphates and ammonium nitrate were supplied
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The agreement provided for any pre-tax profit made in excess of that guaranteed to share­
holders to be treated as credit or to be taken into account when fixing the selling price of 
ammonium nitrate. Conversely, pre-tax profit less than guarantees to shareholders was a 
debt and the selling price for the following year would be fixed to provide for the recovery 
of the amount due to the company. The agreement resulted in a price stabilization account 
|4j which reached Z$62.9 million (US$ 26 million) by 1990.
During the early 1970s fertilizer was heavily subsidized. Direct subsidies were removed 
in 1975 and replaced with equalization funds under which the cheaper raw materials sub­
sidized the more expensive ones. For example, urea was sold at the same price per nutri­
ent tonne as ammonium nitrate despite ammonium nitrate’s lower price per unit of nitro­
g e n  (FAO, 1996).
This embargo continued until the introduction of the structural adjustment policy reforms 
in the 1990s.
145
Dorowa Minerals, G. D. Haulage, Zimbabwe Phosphate Industries, Sable Chemicals and 
Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company are controlled by the Chemplex Corporation which is now 
wholly-owned by the Industrial Development Corporation, a government company. Wind­
mill is owned by the Commercial Cotton Growers’ Association, the Tobacco Association, 
the Grain Producers’ Association, the Farmers’ Coop, the Windmill Pension Fund and 
Windmill Holland.
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to Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company and Windmill for granulation into compound 
fertilizers and marketing to farmers. Both Windmill and Zimbabwe Fertilizer 
Company had invested in sophisticated laboratories and plants for formulating, 
granulating, mixing and bagging fertilizers and crop protection chemicals. The 
companies had sufficient capacity to supply the fertilizer requirements of the 
country. Because it was unusual for demand to exceed domestic capacity, the 
agricultural input industry was largely controlled by a cartel through agricul­
tural input priority committees and membership of the input trade association. 
Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company and Windmill sold fertilizers on an ex-factory 
basis for distribution to smallholder farmers. By 1985 roughly 52 per cent of 
total fertilizer and pesticide sales was distributed through supply and market­
ing cooperative unions located throughout smallholder areas; 21 per cent was 
through the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) small lending groups; 15 
per cent was direct sales from manufacturers; and 12 per cent was through rural 
traders (table 12.2).
Table 12.2: Changes in relative importance of fertilizer distribution channels 
in Zimbabwe, 1985-1995
Year
Distribution channel
1985
%
1990
%
1993
%
1994
%
Cooperative unions 52 15 4 1
AFC Small lending groups 21 13 8 9
AFC Large lending groups n/a n/a 6 5
Rural traders 12 29 30 35
Manufacturers 15 43 52 50
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Source: Bushnell (1999)
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The factories of Windmill and ZFC are located in Harare, which is well situated for dis 
4;tnbuting products by road and rail to different parts of the country.
The agricultural input priority committee system was established by the Ministry of Ag­
riculture in the 1980s to provide estimates of crop areas and livestock numbers and fore-
casts of farmers’ requirements for fertilizers, farm machinery, pesticides, veterinary medi­
caments and packing materials. This information was used by the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce to assess the foreign exchange requirements of agriculture and help with the 
rationing of foreign currency among different imports. Agricultural input companies jointly 
made decisions about inventories, production, expected sales, import requirements and 
selling prices, and submitted these to the committees for ratification.
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The lack of developed markets for the smallholder sector (poor roads, una­
vailability of trucks and limited competition among transport firms and retail­
ers) led to high transport and marketing costs that resulted in retail prices being 
as much as 40 per cent more than ex-factory prices. In addition, farmers had to 
move fertilizer from supply points to their homesteads by wheelbarrows, bicy­
cles and ox-carts.
The crop chemical industry was organized into agents and distributors be­
cause of division of labour and specialization among firms to permit the ben­
efit of economies of scale and scope. Ten companies traded as agents and local 
representatives of multinational chemical companies and competed directly in 
the marketplace: Windmill, Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company, Agricura, Cyana- 
mid, Technical Services, Sprayquip, Graniteside Chemicals, Agrevo and 
Milborrow. Five subsidiaries of multinationals supplied agents with products 
without directly competing in the marketplace: Ciba-Geigy, Hoeschst, Bayer, 
BASF and Rhone-Poulenc. Ciba-Geigy carried out a few direct sales to small­
holders and commercial farmers but these were limited by the high financial, 
transportation and human resource investments and time needed to set up dis­
tribution channels.
The performance of the supply systems varied depending on climatic, eco­
nomic and political factors. Before 1980 there was little seasonal credit for 
fertilizers for smallholders and a natural uptake of around 20,000 product tonnes 
in annual sales (figure 12.1).
Figure 12.1 Annual fertilizer sales in Zimbabwe 1975-1998
600 !
Source: Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 2000
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From graph 12.1, smallholder fertilizer sales increased fourfold from 1981 to 
1986. Sales increased to a peak of 127,000 tonnes during the 1985/86 cropping 
season. The increase was in response to seasonal loans granted by the Agricul­
tural Finance Corporation. However, sales began to decline after the 1986/87 
cropping season as the Agricultural Finance Corporation curtailed seasonal loans 
to smallholders following high default rates. This decrease in sales of fertilizer 
was offset by increased cash purchases. Domestic fertilizer prices were lower 
than import parity prices due to price controls. Using locally manufactured 
fertilizer was profitable and farmers required less than eight kilograms of maize 
grain to buy one kilogram of nitrogen applied as ammonium nitrate and less 
than 15 kilograms of maize to buy one kilogram of compound D fertilizer (fig­
ure 12.2).
However, use of inorganic fertilizers by smallholders started declining from 
the early 1990s because of increased poverty, high prices and lack of conven-
Figure 12.2 Fertilizer to maize grain price ratio, 1970-2001
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Source: Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, 2000
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ient packages at rural trading stores within walking distance o f their homes. It 
was also during this period when environmental sustainability issues arose and 
use of inorganic fertilizers was deemed to be risky. However, the few small­
holders who used inorganic fertilizers applied lower rates than those recom­
mended. Also in smallholder areas, low and erratic rainfall, low soil moisture 
retention and poor soil and crop management limited responses to fertilizer, 
and these reduced returns on investments.
Supply systems and performance under structural adjustment
Before the introduction of the economic structural adjustment programme in 
1990, the government controlled fertilizer and chemical production and trade 
through the allocation of foreign exchange and interventions in domestic trade. 
For example, the government provided an annual foreign exchange budget to 
the Ministry of Agriculture which allocated it among trade associations for 
agricultural machinery, pesticides and seeds. Trade associations, in turn, dis­
tributed foreign exchange to their members. The Ministry of Agriculture also 
required mandatory testing and registration of agricultural inputs before they 
could be offered for sale to farmers and registered producers and traders in 
ways that restricted competition. The ministry protected a private oligopoly in 
fertilizer, pesticide and farm equipment supply by limiting registrations for 
input companies. To limit exploitative pricing by oligopolies, the ministry ad­
ministered price controls on agricultural inputs and commodities in domestic 
trade.
In the wake of structural adjustment policy reforms in the early 1990s, the 
government introduced an export retention scheme, the special horticultural 
facility and the export promotion programme to ease foreign exchange short­
ages and improve the availability of inputs. In 1992 the government modified 
the foreign exchange allocation system to provide some imported inputs such 
as stockfeeds and tyres under the open general import licence system and to 
expand foreign exchange under the export retention scheme that replaced the 
agricultural promotion programme. The government also removed price and 
marketing controls on agricultural machinery, seed, pesticides and fertilizers. 
At the same time government removed controls on producer prices of all crops. 
Following the worst drought in living memory in the 1991/92 season, govern­
ment introduced free crop packs, consisting of seeds, fertilizers and crop chemi­
cals, and contract ploughing through public mechanical tillage units in order to
In 1993, the government lifted price controls for all but two fertilizers, ammonium nitrate 
and compound D (recommended for maize) which are important for smallholder farmers. 
The government then lifted all price controls on fertilizer in mid-1995 and removed the 
subsidies on electricity for Sable’s ammonia plant.
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help resource-poor fanners recover and increase their productivity. After 1992, 
the government implemented five consecutive years of seed, fertilizer and trans­
port crop pack programmes even during favourable rainfall years to ensure that 
smallholders achieved food security and to reduce the cost of drought relief 
food distribution. The government stopped the free crop pack programme dur­
ing the 1997/98 cropping season and began to support development of agro­
input dealers.
The agricultural market liberalization policies of the 1990s resulted in the 
restructuring of the agricultural input industry. For example, Omnia began 
marketing brand fertilizers imported from South Africa in 1995, capturing about 
2 per cent of fertilizer sales in that year. Several small niche players started 
setting up fertilizer companies by targeting overhead, drip or mist irrigation 
markets. These included Hygrotech, Agrevo, BASF, Sprayquip, Ocean Agri­
culture, Agrigrow, Garden Rains Irrigation, Lances Link and Cit Chem. But 
there remained several barriers to entry resulting from controls on registration 
of fertilizer products, distribution, imports and exports. Only large companies 
with resources to circumvent the barriers entered the industry.
In 1996, the demand for fertilizer was projected to grow at 3 per cent per 
annum, mostly because of more intensive fertilizer use by smallholders. Dur­
ing that period, the industry had sufficient capacity to meet expected growth in 
demand from domestic production because of four factors. Firstly, the move to 
bulk blending would enable companies to produce any rate relatively quickly 
compared to granulation. ’ Secondly, the establishment of bulk blending plants 
by Omnia and Nutrichem provided additional capacity to that of Zimbabwe 
Fertilizer Company and Windmill. Thirdly, increased use of high analysis fer­
tilizers by fanners reduced the quantity that had to be manufactured and ap­
plied in crop production. Finally, the local fertilizer market had opened up to 
international competition, particularly from South African based fertilizer com­
panies. South African firms have competitive advantages resulting from excess 
capacity, larger plants and economies of scale because of access to a larger
144
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The drought recovery programme was aided by financial support from the World Bank 
]5 jand the Japanese and German governments.
Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company and Windmill responded to this competition by setting up 
entire horticulture divisions to compete in this segment.
Currently many smallholders are growing crops without fertilizer or applying small quan­
tities. Fertilizer companies are expanding investments in advertising and demonstration 
trials in the better-favoured areas to show smallholders the effects of applying different 
.ra tes of fertilizer.
152 _
Because of bulk blending, fertilizer companies have more flexibility so they can produce 
any product more quickly than with granulation. For example, a granulation plant needs a 
minimum efficient size of 300 to 400 tonnes per run per day. This explains why fertilizer 
firms were restricted to 13 compounds. But with bulk blendings production is simpler, 
quicker and more flexible, enabling the manufacture of a wider range of products.
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domestic market, location in relation to the Zimbabwean market, better pro­
duction know-how, low-cost raw materials, more advanced technology and 
export incentives.
Because of increasing competition, fertilizer companies expanded invest­
ments in marketing their products, particularly to smallholders. Consequently, 
distribution channels were restructured. For example, cooperatives retained 
distribution of less than 1 per cent of fertilizer sales because they collapsed 
following government removal of their monopoly to distribute Agricultural 
Finance Corporation financed sales after farmers complained about high mark­
ups, late deliveries and incorrect deliveries. Fertilizer manufacturers distrib­
uted more than 50 per cent of sales directly through their depots in Harare and 
through sales representatives in specific areas who arranged for groups of farmers 
to collectively purchase fertilizer for cash and then helped arrange truckloads 
for delivery to farmer groups. Table 12.1 reveals that rural trader sales share 
tripled to 35 per cent between 1985 and 1994 while the share of cooperative 
unions plummeted from 52 to 1 per cent during the same period. Likewise, the 
share of Agricultural Finance Corporation small lending groups had fallen be­
cause the corporation had drastically reduced credit to smallholders due to high 
default rates. Because the cooperatives were the only fertilizer distributors lo­
cated within walking distance of farmers in communal areas, their exit meant 
that farmers had to travel greater distances to acquire inputs. Because of loca­
tion, monopolistic behaviour by rural traders -  the high price escalations -  
consequently reduced farmers’ use of fertilizers.
Fertilizer firms have been experimenting with various organizational inno­
vations to more efficiently distribute products to smallholders in remote areas. 
Starting in 1992, Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company established depots in small­
holder areas to improve the availability of fertilizer in areas poorly served by 
traders. However, the company later closed its depots in smallholder areas be­
cause they sold fertilizer for only a few months of the year making them non­
competitive compared to rural traders who could spread their overheads through­
out the year by selling an array of consumer products. During the 1995/96 
cropping season, CARE Zimbabwe and the African Centre for Fertilizer De­
velopment began to support the development of a network of community-based 
agribusiness dealers in five districts in Masvingo and Midlands provinces. The 
project then scaled up and by 2001 had covered a network of 500 community- 
based agribusiness agents throughout smallholder areas around the country,
In the early 1980s, the South African fertilizer industry consisted of several players: Triomf, 
Senlrachem, Omnia, Fedmis, and Bonus. These consolidated through mergers and acqui­
sitions into three companies: Kynock, Sasol and Omnia. Annual fertilizer production ca­
pacity in South Africa is 3 million tonnes. Currently annual sales average 2.2 million 
tonnes, which leaves a balance of 800,000 tonnes in excess capacity.
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linked to agricultural input suppliers (CARE Zimbabwe, 2001).
The opening up of the fertilizer market meant local companies had to trans­
form themselves to operate under the new environment. Thus fertilizer firms 
refurbished plants and expanded capability and flexibility to supply adequate 
quantities under the competitive environment. Reforms began to have an im­
pact from 1995 when government ended price controls on common maize fer­
tilizers. Also, in February 1996, contracts that bound Zimbabwe Fertilizer Com­
pany and Windmill to buy ammonium nitrate from Sable expired resulting in 
competitive sourcing of fertilizers from outside the region and imported through 
South Africa. The annual imports of compound (NPK) fertilizers sharply in­
creased from below 500 tonnes, the average from 1990 to 1993, to 12,000 
tonnes in 1994, 14,310 tonnes in 1995 and 48,435 tonnes in 1996. The reforms 
also had some impact on technology transfer as more compounds were regis­
tered (over 260 products registered between 1991 and 1996 compared to 18 
products available from 1960 to 1990), private soil tests were undertaken (four 
privately-owned laboratories offering soil testing services in competition with 
the government’s laboratory) and there were new entrants to the business but 
impact on volume of fertilizer applied cannot be claimed (Gisselquist and Rusike, 
1997).
Overall, use of fertilizers during the 1990s was dominated by unfavourable 
weather conditions, free fertilizer programmes and unstable economic condi­
tions. Following the 1991/92 record drought season, smallholder farmer ferti­
lizer purchases fell to 33,000 tonnes in 1992/93. But the government supplied 
180,000 tonnes of fertilizer to smallholder farmers for free in 1992/93 through 
the drought relief crop packs programme. The government reduced fertilizer 
distributed through drought relief to 69,000 tonnes in 1993/94; 18,600 in 1994/ 
95; and 28,600 in 1995/96. Thus smallholder farmer fertilizer sales had a down­
ward trend as compared to commercial purchase levels. The fertilizer prices 
rose to import parity following the lifting of production subsidies and price 
controls. Fertilizer to maize price ratios increased and this reduced levels of 
use of inorganic fertilizers by smallholder farmers. Because of the decrease in 
international urea prices, it became cheaper to import nitrogen into Zimbabwe 
than to manufacture it.
4 If nitrogen is landed in Zimbabwe at US$ 120 per tonne of ammonium nitrate equivalent, 
then Sable’s electrolysis-based production is uncompetitive. However, if nitrogen is im­
ported at a price higher than US$ 210 then Sable’s plant is competitive. Sable currently 
has an advantage compared lo competitors of US$ 50 per tonne in moving fertilizers from 
Durban to Harare.
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Supply systems and performance under the fast track land resettle­
m ent programme
The land occupations from 2000 coincided with a downfall in economic per­
formance, changes of policy in the agriculture sector and political instability. 
The land reform commonly referred to as the fast track land resettlement pro­
gramme and the resulting agrarian reform came with a new structure in land 
ownership. The new land ownership structure in place resulted in increased 
demand for fertilizers and pesticides. Within this period, the country experi­
enced critical foreign currency and fuel shortages, mainly due to the country’s 
poor economic performance plus strained relationships with donor agencies. 
While there was an increase in areas planted to most crops, productivity was 
affected by problems in the availability and accessibility of important inputs 
for fertilizers.
The country has a well-developed fertilizer industry whose ownership is 
shared but dominated by about six entities, including government, private firms 
and former large-scale commercial farmers. The crucial raw material for ferti­
lizer production is nitrogen. Ammonium nitrate, manufactured by Sable, sup­
plies over 90 per cent of the country's total fertilizer requirements. The ammo­
nia plant has an annual capacity of 80,000 tonnes while the ammonium nitrate 
plant has a capacity of 250,000 tonnes, requiring 115,000 tonnes of ammonia. 
These capacities are currently underused. In 2002 there was an annual ammo­
nia shortfall of 35,000 tonnes which was imported from Sasol in South Africa. 
Extra demand was filled by imports by Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company, Omnia 
and Windmill in the form of urea because ammonium nitrate remained banned 
in South Africa and could not pass overland in South Africa for export. Ammo­
nia sulphate and sodium nitrate are imported because of a lack of capacity for 
local manufacture. These are used in tea estates and tobacco production. Norsk 
Hydro has been retailing imported calcium nitrate for the horticultural indus­
try.
Zimphos manufactures single superphosphate by reacting phosphate rock 
concentrate from Dorowa Minerals mining operations with mainly imported 
sulphuric acid and triple superphosphate by reacting phosphoric acid with rock 
phosphate. Zimphos has an annual production capacity of 200,000 tonnes sin­
gle superphosphate and 60,000 tonnes triple superphosphate, which in normal 
seasons is just sufficient to meet the country’s total phosphate requirement. 
The third most important raw material is potassium which is mainly imported. 
The superphosphates and ammonium nitrate are supplied to Zimbabwe Ferti­
lizer Company and Windmill for granulation into compound fertilizers and dis­
tribution to farmers. Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company and Windmill produce 13 
compound fertilizers approved by the fertilizer advisory committee. The total 
annual production capacity of granulation plants is 300,000 tonnes. Zimbabwe
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Fertilizer Company and Windmill have installed bulk blenders with a capacity 
of 100,000 tonnes and 50,000 tonnes respectively. Omnia imports all its ferti­
lizers from its parent company in South Africa. From 2002, an input dealing 
company called Farmers World started importing small amounts of fertilizer 
blends. This meant that the fertilizer industry continued to be heavily depend­
ent on imports.
Whilst demand for all types of fertilizers has increased tremendously, local 
companies fail to produce to full capacity due to shortages and controls of 
foreign exchange needed to purchase raw materials. For example, Zimphos 
annually needs about US$915,000 for sulphur importation and US$580,000 
for sulphuric acid plant maintenance. Sourcing this foreign currency on the 
parallel market in the face of controlled product price has not been viable. 
Capacity use is also affected by shortages of fuel and electricity and poor trans­
port services by the National Railways of Zimbabwe. The demand for fertiliz­
ers was estimated at 600,000 tonnes for the 2003/04 season and industry was 
expected to produce only 350,000 tonnes, well below the projected require­
ments (Eben Makonese, Chemplex CEO). Price controls on products intro­
duced in 2001 were another factor that restricted production to capacity levels. 
Zimbabwe had the lowest fertilizer prices in the region at US$3 to US$6 per 
50kg bag in 2002 when regional prices were more than US$20 per bag. These 
prices continued to provide incentives for cross-border informal exportation of 
the subsidized fertilizer to neighbouring countries. Only compound D and am­
monium nitrate remained controlled by the government. To evade the price 
controls, companies manufacture brands of fertilizers that are not controlled 
and these are priced at levels that most new farmers cannot afford, thus reduc­
ing use of fertilizer and production.
The fertilizer industry could potentially become self sufficient in its for­
eign currency requirements if it were allowed to export part of its output. The 
foreign currency earned would then be used in the industry to self-finance im­
ports of essential raw materials. Estimates from Zimbabwe Fertilizer Company 
and Windmill suggest that permission to export 40,000 to 100,000 tonnes of 
fertilizer products would remove the foreign currency constraint to production 
currently being experienced by the industry.
Prior to the fast track land reform programme, large-scale commercial farm­
ers planted 570,000 hectares, using an average of 700kgs of fertilizer product 
per hectare, thus purchasing about 400.000 tonnes per annum. At least 1.2 mil­
lion smallholder farmers planted 2.3 million hectares, using less than 50kgs of 
product per hectare and purchasing about 100,000 tonnes. The projected re­
quirements of 600,000 tonnes of fertilizer in any season as suggested seemed 
too optimistic in the short term, given the following constraints: historical lev­
els of smallholder fertilizer application rates; most new farmers being former 
communal farmers; the low uptake of A2 land; and financial resource limita-
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tions, among other reasons. It is estimated that the effective demand is below 
500,000 tonnes of fertilizer and well within the potential capacity of the exist­
ing production infrastructure, even though it is underused. However, there is 
need to upgrade the existing production infrastructure for envisaged increased 
future demand. As more farmers take up land, especially under the A2 scheme, 
demand for fertilizer will increase. Given the current low capacity use due to 
the low foreign currency allocation to the industry and fuel, electricity and 
transport constraints, fertilizer shortfalls are likely to continue for the coming 
seasons.
The fertilizer availability problems have been compounded by accessibil­
ity constraints faced by traditional outlets. A key problem is that the huge de­
mand from government-managed input schemes (through the Grain Marketing 
Board and Agricultural Rural Development Authority) has diverted inputs from 
traditional outlets such as retail shops, leading to shortages. Late ordering which 
at times required foreign currency and posed logistical problems within the 
systems, has led to late deliveries to farmers. Limitations on the quantities one 
can acquire as well as non-discrimination in terms of capability of farmers -  
including whether or not one is really a farmer -  has meant farmers with the 
resources and skills to plant larger areas could not access adequate inputs. The 
fact that non-farmers could acquire fertilizer at low, government-controlled 
prices also led to the development of a thriving parallel market and hoarding by 
some large-scale farmers where prices became as high as double the official 
prices, further reducing access to inputs. This marketing pattern had the effect 
of increasing farmers’ transaction and production costs in general, and added 
to the limited access that small, poor and vulnerable farmers faced (Jayne et 
al., 2003).
Restructuring fertilizer supply systems: major challenges
A number of challenges face the fertilizer supply industries and demand for 
fertilizer in the future. The shortages of foreign currency are likely to continue 
for some time and this will continue to affect fertilizer supplies. Although the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has introduced a system to ensure access to for­
eign currency to import raw materials and concessional financing for increas­
ing operations in the productive sector, the allocations are still below company 
requirements. Thus, Zimphos and Sable Chemicals will continue operating 
below capacity for some time and will not be able to meet demand. The second 
challenge is to find ways of significantly increasing levels of fertilizer use by 
smallholders and the newly resettled farmers in order to raise their productiv­
ity, incomes and food security. Although most smallholders are poor and lack 
purchasing power for the technologies and services at recommended levels, 
high returns for investments can only be achieved when guidelines are fol-
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lowed. The HIV and AIDS pandemic is compounding farmers’ problems of 
access to working capital and labour because of the loss of family members 
working on farms and members supplying remittances from urban areas. Nev­
ertheless, increased use of fertilizers has to be achieved without subsidies be­
cause the government has a budgetary constraint and donors are unwilling to 
fund subsidies. The third challenge is to restructure marketing channels to re­
duce farm-gate prices and improve product availability within walking dis­
tance of farmers and the quality of local dealer services. The fourth challenge is 
to increase the competitiveness of fertilizer firms in the domestic, regional and 
international markets to meet increasing competition resulting from falling trade 
barriers and globalization.
A number of strategies can be used to ensure capacity use of fertilizer com­
panies. Demand for fertilizer is envisaged to increase as more farmers grasp 
farming skills and supplies can be increased by either allocating all foreign 
currency requirements or allowing companies to export some products. Ferti­
lizer use by farmers could be increased by the adoption of new agricultural 
research and extension practices, including learning-based and empowerment 
methods such as farmer participatory research and farmer field schools which 
help farmers analyze broad technology options instead of focusing on a single 
technical recommendation. Technology development, dissemination and adop­
tion are more likely to be successful if the options are farmer-driven and con­
sistent with the portfolio of investments households have made to support their 
diverse livelihoods. Opportunities also exist to expand use by reducing farm- 
gate prices and improving timeliness and availability through adoption by manu­
facturers of more aggressive marketing strategies, by shortening distribution 
channels and by improving the quality of services provided by rural retailers. 
To improve competitiveness, Zimbabwean firms need to: rationalize their prod­
uct lines; invest in more efficient plant and equipment; innovate and upgrade 
products; search for new portfolios of products and service offerings tailored to 
diverse types of farmers; ensure customers of quality through certification un­
der international standards organizations; establish strategic alliances with glo­
bal players; and expand sales in regional markets in order to achieve econo­
mies of scale and scope and to drive down unit costs of farm inputs.
A major constraint on expanded use is price escalation which results from 
long chains of distribution and high transport and transaction costs. Under struc­
tural adjustment, the government was expected to exit input markets and let the 
private sector take over. Because of high transport costs, the lack of storage 
facilities, the lack of credit and high risk, farm input manufacturers and rural 
traders have not expanded investments. Consequently, most farmers are unable 
to access the right type of inputs in the right amounts at the right place, time 
and price. Mechanisms are needed to build missing rural markets in order to 
improve and broaden farmers’ access to inputs while also reducing transaction
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costs and expanding output markets, productivity and incomes. The govern­
ment urgently needs to improve access to markets, especially in view of the 
ongoing land reform. The current emphasis on training and linking rural trad­
ers with agricultural input suppliers represents one way of linking agricultural 
technology development with market improvement to facilitate widespread use 
of improved technologies. But sm allholders and new farm ers need 
countervailing power to reduce location monopolistic behaviour by rural trad­
ers. Because of the high cost of imports, the government needs to make strate­
gic investments in roads and rails to reduce the cost of raw materials and prod­
ucts. Zimbabwean companies need to increase their competitiveness in the 
Southern African Development Community and Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) markets to diversify business and financial 
risks. For example, Zimplow is currently penetrating new markets in Tanzania, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana with high-quality but competitively priced 
products manufactured in ISO 9002 rated factories. Suppliers from India cur­
rently dominate these markets and yet Zimbabwean companies are better posi­
tioned to service these countries. Agricultural input exports would benefit from 
a devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar and reduction of intra-regional trade 
barriers through harmonization of agricultural input policies between Southern 
African Development Community member states.
Conclusion
Smallholder agricultural input supply systems began to emerge during the 1940s 
and 1950s from spill-overs of public and private sector investments targeted at 
large-scale commercial farmers. Initial growth resulted from market expansion 
of multinational firms based in South Africa and Europe. Following UDI and 
the imposition of sanctions in 1965, the pattern of development changed when 
several Zimbabwean-based firms were established to substitute for imports using 
local raw materials in order to circumvent sanctions. This resulted in the devel­
opment of a diversified and sophisticated agricultural input industry capable of 
meeting large-scale commercial farmers’ requirements for inputs. However, 
fertilizer industries functioned under regulatory controls by the government to 
protect domestic industry from international competitors. Regulatory controls 
on agricultural inputs trade blocked technology transfer to smallholders through 
markets. This resulted in poor product availability and limited choice for ferti­
lizers, blocked entry of competing brands, high costs and delays on introduc­
tion of new products for pesticides and limited choices for agricultural machin­
ery.
Following independence in 1980, there was a rapid growth in the use of 
hybrid maize seed, fertilizers, pesticides and farm equipment by smallholders, 
especially in the better-favoured farming areas. This was because of access to
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Agricultural Finance Corporation seasonal credit. Hybrid seed and fertilizer 
use declined following the collapse of the seasonal credit scheme during the 
late 1980s. The government implemented reforms in the 1990s to expand input 
firms’ access to foreign exchange and remove mandatory testing and registra­
tion of inputs, price controls and fertilizer subsidies. Removal of subsidies and 
price controls resulted in increased product availability, product quality and 
innovation, information and manufacturer and dealer services.
The industry is being challenged to re-engineer itself, strategize on how to 
meet increased demand following the land and agrarian reform, find ways of 
increasing levels of use of inputs by smallholders and new farmers, and supply 
technologies relevant to the boundaries of resource endowments and diverse 
livelihoods for smallholders, especially in marginal semi-arid areas. The in­
dustry needs to find ways of meeting increased demand in the wake of the ever- 
changing operating environment, meeting such constraints as foreign currency 
shortages and price controls by the government. The market is also rapidly 
globalizing following the entry of several South African and global players so 
the industry needs to increase its competitiveness in domestic and regional 
markets.
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